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~N.THE.SUPREME.C<?URT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------
KELLY GRAFF and KERI 
GRAFF, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 18062 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff's-Appellants KELLY & KERI GRAFF (hereinafter "The 
GRAFFS") take this appeal from a Declaratory Judgment Action 
filed first before the Third Judicial District Court, and later 
transferred to the Fourth Judicial District Court, seeking to 
invalidate a mechanics lien filed against the GRAFFS property 
by defendant- respondent BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION (hereinafter 
"BOISE"). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was submitted to the court on cross motions for 
Summary Judgment. Following extensive briefing, the court 
granted BOISE'S Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied the 
GRAFFS Motion. 
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As far back as 1909, the Utah Supreme Court, in Park City 
M~at"C6~ ~~-·c6m~t6ck Sil~e~-Miriiri~ Co~; 103 P.254, refused to 
invalidate a mechanic's lien for merely "technical" deficiencies. 
In that case, the court discussed the proper judicial construc-
tion of the mechanic's lien statute, and stated that: 
"The more modern decisions • • • are to 
the effect that mechanic's lien 
statutes should receive a fair and 
reasonable, if not a liberal, construction, 
with a view to preserving their 
spirit and effectuating their purposes. 
(citations omitted) It may be further 
said that the more modern decisions 
are practically harmonious in holding 
that where there has been a substantial 
compliance with the statute created 
in the lien, and the lien has in fact 
been established, the lien so estab-
lished will not be defeated by mere 
technicalities not by nice distinctions. 
(citing) Lumber" Co. v. Martin, 31 
Utah 249, 87 P.2d 714; 20 A. & E. 
Encyclopedia (2d Ed.) 276. 
In the more recent case of Cha~e·~~ Dawsori, 215 P.2d 390 (Utah 
1950), the Utah Supreme Court construed the mechanic's lien sta-
tutory notice requirements and stated that "substantial 
compliance with the statute is all that is requir~d." 
These cases are in accord with the general rule as stated in 
53 Am. Jur. 2d "Mechanic's Liens", 227: 
" ••• recognition has been given to the 
principle that where the purpose of the 
requirement that a particular statement 
be included in the claim of lien has been 
achieved and no one is prejudiced, technical 
requirements should not stand in the way 
of achieving the purpose of the mecahnic's 
3 
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lien law. Thus, even though a claim 
contains some defect or error it may 
be upheld where the owner is apprised 
of the claim and not misled thereby or 
prejudiced in any manner. Immaterial 
errors or defects do nto avoid the lien." 
(Citations omitted). 
The Graffs argue before this court, as they did below, that 
the foregoing "substantial compliance" standard has been aban-
doned in Utah and in other jurisdictions, in favor of a "strict 
compliance" standard which invalidates Notices of Mechanic's 
Liens on the basis of small,f technical inconsistencies. In sup-
port of this contention, the Graffs cite numerous cases where 
defects appearing on the face of Notices of Mechanic's lien, sup-
posedly analogous to those asserted in the instant case, have 
been held to invalidate the respective lien holders' lien 
interest. 
In fact, the principles of law relied upon by Plaintiffs in 
their attempt to invalidate Boise's lien have co-existed with 
doctrine of substantial compliance ever since the mechanic's and 
materialman's lien was first recognized as a statutory remedy to 
the contractor and supplier, and in no way abrogate or modify the 
"substantial compliance" standard. The two principals may be 
stated as follows: 
1. A mechanic's lien is a creature of statute, in deroga-
tion of the common law rights of the property owner, and must 
4 
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therefore be in complete compliance with all statutory prere-
quesites to its validity (see Utah Savings.and Loari·A~s6ci~tion 
v~·Mecham, 12 Utah 2d. 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961); Eccles :Lumber 
Coinpany·v. ·Martin·, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906)). 
2. Where, however, a notice of mechanic's lien is in 
compliance with the substance and purpose of the statute giving 
rise thereto, technical deficiencies and nice distinctions, which 
do not inure to the detriment of any parties, will not be per-
mitted to defeat the validity of the lien filing (see Chase v~· 
Dawson, 215 P.2d 390 (1950); Park City Meat.Company v~ Comstock 
Silver.Mining Company, 103 P. 254 (1909)). As stated by the 
Arizona Court of Appeals in Lewis·v~ Midway Lumber, Inc~, 114 
Arizona 750, 561 P.2d 750 (Ct. App. Ariz. Div. 2, 1977), 
"The provisions of ARS 33-993 must be strictly 
followed. (citations omitted) However, the 
Arizona liens statutes are remedial and to be 
liberally construed. (citations omitted) This 
means that the steps required by ARS 33-993 . 
to impose the lien must be followed, but in deter-1 
mining what these steps are, the Court will give 
the words a meaning which is reasonable, consis-
tent with all the language used, and conducive 
to the purpose accomplished by the enactment 
of the statute. Thus, substantial compliance 
not inconsistent with the legislative pur-
pose is sufficient." 
The Arizona Court is in accord with the general principles pf 
mechanic's lien law expressed in 53 Am. Jur. 2d., Mechanic's 
Liens, 210: "The statutory requirements, whatever they may be, 
5 
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must be substantially, or, as stated in some cases, strictly, 
compiled with, in order to perfect the lien. A claim which does 
not comply with such requirements is defective and invalid. On. 
the other hand, the lien claim is not itself a pleading, and 
substantial compliance in good faith is sufficient to meet such 
requirements, and some statutes expressly declare that substan-
tial compliance shall be deemed sufficient." 
In light of the foregoing, the issue with which this court· 
is faced is that of whether or not Boise's Notice and Claim of 
Mechanic's lien in the instant case -(attached as Exhibit "A" to 
the Graffs' Appellate Brief) substantially complies with Utah's 
Mechanic's Lien Law, notwithstanding the alleged infirmaties 
asserted by the Graffs. 
POINT II 
BOISE'S NOTICE AND CLAIM OF MECHANIC'S 
LIEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE 
VERIFICATION AND OATH REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH LAW. 
As show on the face of the Notice and Claim of Mechanic's 
lien relied upon by Boise (see Exhibit A to the Graffs Appellate 
Brief), 'Boise's agent, Berk Buttars, signed his name to the 
notice above a printed oath form which admittedly complies with 
Utah law, and had his signature duly notarized. The Graffs argue 
that this was insufficient, in that Mr. Buttars did not sign his 
name again following the printed oath. 
6 
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In a case which was factually identical to the instant case, 
and where a signature was omitted following the form of oath but 
was signed on the line above, the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
the verification requirement was satisfied. See, Stephenson v. · 
Ketchican· Spruce Mills, !nc., 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966). In 
that case, the court stated: 
"Substantial compliance with the veri-
fication requirement is sufficient. 
There is a substantial compliance here. 
The form of oath followed by the words 
'subscribed and sworn, to before me ••• ', 
and the notary public's signature, 
amounts in substance to a certificate 
by the notary that the claim of lien 
was verified by the oath of Anderson. 
The claim of lien is not ineffective 
by reason of any insufficienty in the 
requirement for verification." Id~ 
at 499. -
To the same effect are the cases of Lyons·v. Howard, 16 N.M. 
327, 117 P.842 (1911) and Ai~~li~ ~~ Kohn 16 Or. 363, 19 P~97, 
103 (1888). 
In support of their contention that the "substantial 
compliance" standard has been abandoned with respect to verifica-
tion and oath requirements of mechanic's lien law, the Graff's 
cite the decisions of H.A.M~S~ C6~~ariy-~. Electrical·Contractors 
of.Alaska~ 563 P.2d 258 (Supreme Court Alaska, 1977), and First 
Securiti Mort~a~e-Co~pariy-~.·Hariseri 631 P.2d 919 (1981) for the 
proposition that, in Alaska as in Utah, the principles announced 
in the Ketchi~ari S~ruce Mills case have been overruled in favor 
7 
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of a strict compliance standard. Such an assertion is clearly 
misplaced. 
In the case of First Security.Mortgage Company v~·Hansen, 
cited supra, which dealt with facts substantially similar to 
those underlying the H.A~M~s.·company decision in Alaska, Justice 
Howe affirmed a trial court decision invalidating a notice of 
mechanic's lien containing a corporate acknowledgment, but no 
verification of the contents of the lien. The acknowledgement 
there in question read as follows: 
"on the 9th day of November, 1977, personally 
appeared before me Roy B. Moore, who being 
duly sworn, did say that he is the attorney 
for Integral Steel Structures, and that said 
instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of a resolution of its 
board of directors, and said Roy B. Moore 
acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same." 
Justice Howe aptly observed that "t:he acknowledgement in this 
case did not contain even a general verification of the subject 
matter of the notice of claim. The only fact that was sworn to 
was the identity and authority of the person signing the claim. 
There is no suggestion that he personally vouched for the 
accuracy of the facts underlying the claim." Justice Howe then 
quoted from the decision of H~A~f.i~s~·company v •. Electrical'Con~ 
tractor~ of Alask~;·tric., cited ~upra, observing that 
"It is establised in law that a verification 
is sworn statement of the truth of the facts 
stated in the instrument which it verifies. 
8 
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A verification differs from an acknowledgement 
in that the latter is a method of authen-
ticating an instrument by showing that it was 
the act of the person executing it." 
This Court was entirely correct in refusing to validate a 
Notice of Mechanic's Lien which nowhere contains even the impli-
cation of a verification. Case law is very clear that such an 
omission is material, and does not substantially comply with the 
requirements of law. In the instant case, however, the language 
of verification appearing on the face of the notice of lien is 
clear and unmistakable, and the lien claimant's oath in connec-
tion therewith is duly notarized. The only relevant question is 
whether or not the lien claimant's signature appears in the 
proper location. As such, the Harisen decision, like H~A.M.S. 
decision, is inapplicable on its facts. It should, however, be 
pointed out that the Hansen decision, even in its dicta, nowhere 
makes mention of an abandonment of the substantial compliance 
standard in effect in Utah for 75 years. !/ 
!I It should also be noted that, in 1980, the Supreme Court of 
Alaska reaffirmed the substantial compliance test in the decision 
of'Anch6ra·e·$arid.and Gravel.Coin.an· Inc~ v~ ·wooldrid e, 619 P.2d 
1014 Sup. Ct. A aska 980 • In that case, a Notice o 
Mechanic's Lien contained a printed notary's jurat, certifying 
that a corporate officer had appeared before the notary, anp had 
sworn that the contents of the notice of lien were true and 
(continued on next page) 
9 
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I 
Other Western jurisdications have simil1arly adopted the 
substantial compliance test regarding verif'ications of claims of 
mechanic's lien. In the decision of Gar~etjt.Building.Ciritifi; 
lnc~ v~ Hale, 95 N.M. 450, 623 P.2d 570 (1981), the New Mexico 
Supreme Court specifically adopted the subs'tantial compliance 
test, ruling that technical deficiencies the verification of 
the two mechanic~s liens there in question were not sufficiently 
grave to invalidate the liens, where none of the parties in 
interest had been prejudiced thereby. The Graffs' attempt to 
rely on the decision of 1.ewis. v~. MidwaY Lumber, cited supra, for 
the proposition that the State of Arizona has abandoned the 
substantial compliance standard is clearly misplaced. That deci~ 
sion, where relevant to this case, dealt with the total omission, 
by two mechanic.' s lien claimants, of the name of the owner from 
the lien notice. The Arizona Supreme Court specifically endorsed 
th~ doctrine of substantial compliance. The same standard was 
later reaffirmed in the case of Westirighotise-Electri~"Sup~l~ 
(footnote continued) 
correct. The officer did not sign following the certification: 
only the·., notary affixed his signature thereafter. The court, 
· observin·g that "no particular form of oath or affirmation is 
required by Alaska law", ruled that, as the documents clearly 
evidenced that the officer had appeared before the notary and had 
sworn to the truth of the contents of the lien, the statutory 
requirements had been satisfied. 
10 
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Company·v~ ·\.lestern.Seed Production Corp., 119 Ariz. 377, 580 P.2d 
1231 Ct. App. Ariz., Div. 1, 1978). 
The only decision quoted by the Graffs, in fact, which does 
not fully comport with a substantial compliance standard 
regarding verification is that of Saunders. Cash-Way. Lumber. and .. 
Hardware Company v. Herrick, Mont. 587 P.2d 947 (Sup. Ct. 
Montana, 1978). In that case, it was held that a verification in 
which a lien claimant swore to the content of the lien as true 
"to the best of his knowledge, information and belief" invali-
dated the mechanic's lien in that the verification oath did not 
reflect sufficient certainty. The decision must be regarded as 
an anomaly, and has since been ignored in other jurisdicti~ns on 
similar facts (see, e.g. Marsh v •. Coleman, 93 N.M. 325, 600 P.2d 
271 (Sup. Ct. N.M., 1979)). Such a technically demajding stan-
dard is clearly at variance with the underlying policy of 
mechanic's lien law, and would inflict needless injury on the 
valid rights of countless lien claimants. 
In the instant case, Boise's agent, Berk Buttars, signed the 
notice of lien in question, and his oath regarding the accuracy 
and truth of the notice was duly notarized. No one has be~n 
misled, prejudiced or injured by Mr. Buttars' failure to affix 
two signatures to the document instead of one (see Point IV 
infra). It is therefore submitted that, as the trial court 
11 
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observed, Boise's Notice and Claim of Mechanic's Lien was in 
substantial compliance with the verificationa nd oath require-
ments of Utah law, and created a valid mechanic's lien on the 
Graffs' property. 
POINT III 
BOISE'S ERRONEOUS OMMISSION OF THE PRINCIPAL 
CONTRACTOR'S NAME ON THE FACE OF ITS NOTICE OF MECHANIC'S 
LIEN DID NOT INVALIDATE BOISE'S LIEN INTEREST UNDER UTAH LAW. 
The Graffs' second contention regarding the validity of the 
lien notice filed by Boise in the instant action deals with the 
fact that it allegedly fails to state the name of the individual 
to whom Defendant furnished materials. As can be seen from the 
fact of the document, Boise inadvertently entered its own name, 
rather than that of Roncor, in the space provided for the name of 
the recipient of the materials. Roncor was listed, however, as 
the owner of the lands, buildings, and improvements to be charged 
with the lien. Moreover, no allegation is made that the omission 
complained of inured to the prejudice of any party in any way. 
To the contrary, the Graffs' conduct in the instant action 
clearly evidences that they had ac~ual reocrd notice of the iden-
tity of the lienor under Boise's Notice of Lien. The rule in 
such cases was stated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Peccole v. 
Ltice ~rid'G6odfell6~, 212 P.2d 718, 723-24 (1949): 
"Courts will not give the statute such a 
narrow or technical construction as to 
12 
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fritter away, impede or destroy the right 
of the lien claimant. As a general rule 
a mistake in the statement as to the name 
of the person with whom plaintiff contracted 
or by whom he was employed will not defeat 
the lien, where there was no intention to 
deceive and no one has been misled to his 
detriment." (emphasis added) 
It has also been held by several courts that, where the per-
son by whom the lienor was employed or to whom he furnished 
materials can be reasonably inferred or ascertained upon an exa-
mination of the entire lien, notice is sufficient and the lien is 
valid. See~., Pec6lle·v. tuce and Goodfellow, supra at 725; 
53 Am. Jur. 2d "Mechanic Liens" 228 at p. 749, and cases cited 
therein; First.National Bank in Fort Collins v~ Sam McClure and 
Son,-Inc.~ C616., 431 P.2d 460 Sup. Ct. Colo. 1967); Boyce v. 
Knudson, 219 Kan. 357, 548 P.2d 712 (Sup. ct. Kan., 1976); State 
Ex •. Rel.Nilsen v. ·aoff, or. App., 474 P.2d 11 (Ct. App. 
2/ Or., 1970). - Once again the prevailing standard is that of 
substantial compliance. 
~/ Before the court below, the Graffs represented that the 
Pecolle decision had been.overruled bythe Nevada Supreme.Court 
in the decision of Fischei:.- lfr6thers "-\7 •. Harrah. Realt .. Com. an , 
Nevada 545 P.2d 203 Sup. Ct. Nev. 1976 • In that per curiam 
decision, the notice of mechanic's lien in question was invali-
dated in that the claimant made no attempt of any kind to serve 
notice of the lien upon the property owner, as required by N.R.S. 
108.227. It is clear that a lien claimant who completely ignores 
such a statutory requirement has not substantially complied with 
the applicable mechanic's lien law. Neither the Fisher Brothers 
decision, however, nor any other case of record overrules the 
(continued on next page) 
13 
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POINT IV 
CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY AND EQUITY DEMAND 
ENFORCEMENT OF BOISE'S LIEN 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the decision of Frehner v •. Mortori, 
18 Utah 2d. 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967), observed that the purpose 
of the Utah Mecahnic's Lien Statute is "to protect those who have 
added directly to the valtte of real property by performing labor 
or furnishing material upon it. (Citation omitted) The statute 
is intended and designed to prevent the owner of land from taking 
the benefits of improvements placed on his property without 
·paying for the labor and materials that went into them." 
There is no question in this case of unfair injury, or even 
of surprise. The Graffs, by accepting title to the property in 
qeustion, impliedly undertook to satisfy all encumbrances of 
record thereon. They now seek to escape that responsibility by 
setting.before the Court two inconsequential shorcomings appearing 
on the face of Boise's Notice of M~chanic's Lien. To invalidate 
Boise's interest in the subject property on such grounds would 
fly directly in the face of the purpose and policy of mechanic's 
lien law. It would, moreover, leave Boise without recourse; t~e 
(footnote continued) 
Peccole opinion, which was, in fact, cited by the Arizona Supreme 
Court as controlling authority for the continued vitality of the 
substantial. compliance doctrine. in the case of WestinShouse 
Electric Supply Company: v~. Western Seed .. Production Corp., cited 
supra. 
14 
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general contractor, Rancor, Inc., is now inoperable and judgment-
proof. It is precisely this situation that mechanic's lien law 
was devised to remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is submitted that the trial 
courts order granting Boise's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be affirmed by this court. 
DATED this~a~'--day of March, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
ROBERT D MAACK Zc:-
Attorneys for Defendant 
Boise Cascade Corporation 
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